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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
J. R. WALKER,
Plaintiff and Res1pondent,

vs.
TRACY LOAN & TRUST COMP ANY, a corporation as receiver
for WALKER BROTHERS DRY
GOODS COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
5338
BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT

Defendant and Appellant.
Al>s.

Trano.

The Lower Court, prior to the institution of
this action, required the appellant to set aside
a fund of $11,268.33 out of which certain claims
against the appellant could be paid in full, in
case they were finally adjudged preferred claims.
Respondent's claim of $2,909.85 went to make up
the totaJ of $11,268.33. By the judgment of the
Lower 1Court in this action, the appellant was
ordered to pay to the respondent his claim in
full out of said sum. The findings of fact upon
which this judgment is founded are in substantial
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accord with the allegations of plaintiff's complaint. There is ample evidence in the record, as
will be shown hereafter, to support these findings; in fact, the evidence supporting the findings and in turn the allegations of plaintiff's
complaint are uncontradicted.
An examination of the Assignments of Error
indicates but a single question to be determined
upon this appea.il, namely, Is the claim of respondent a preferred claim, or does he stand
with reference to said claim as a common creditor~

At the outset it is respectfully submitted

that if plaintiff's complaint states a cause of
action for a preference then this appeal should
fail and the judgment of the Lower Court should
be sustained. The sufficiency of the complaint
has never been attacked. There are no affirmative allegations in defendant's answer. The first
five paragraphs of the complaint are admitted by
the answer. Paragraph six reads as follows:

"6.

That prior to the appointment of

the defendant as receiver of Walker
Brothers Dry Goods Company, as aforesaid, the plaintiff de<livered to and depos-
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ited with the said Walker Brothers Dry
Goods Company the sum of $2,909.85, to
be retained and held by the said Walker
Brothers Dry Goods Company for the sole
and specific and special purpose, and that
only, of securing the payment and of paying for the future goods, wares and merchandise to be purchased by the wife of
plaintiff

from

Walker

Brothers

Dry

Goods store; that the said deposit so made
by plaintiff to Walker Brothers Dry
Goods Company, as aforesaid, was accepted and held by

vV alker

Brothers Dry

Goods store as a special fund or deposit
in trust for the specific use and purpose
for which it was delivered, received, accepted and held, to-wit: the satisfaction
and payment of future advances and sales
of goods, wares

and merchandise by

\Valker Brothers Dry Goods store to the
wife of pJaintiff, as aforesaid, and not
otherwise.''
In its answer appellant admits the indebtedness
of $2,909.85 but denies the other allegations in
said paragraph. Paragraphs eight, ten and elev-
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en of plaintiff's complaint are admitted m defendant's ansv,'er, m1d paragraphs nine, twelve
and thirteen denied. We need only to examineinto the e·vidence to ascertain whether or not
the allegations of paragraph six are sustained.
If so, the allegations of paragraphs nine, twelve
and thirteen are necessarily true.

EVIDENCE
Amy B. Chase was the first witness called.
On her direct examination she testified:

18

24

"A.

At this time Mr. ·walker asked

me to transfer the account of Alice Young
Frye from her savings account to pay the
account of Mrs. J. R. vValker and it left
a balance of two thousand dollars, somewhere around that. He said Mrs. \Valker
would be charging more merchandise and
we would use that to pay the account, use
this two thousand to pay the account
when her account was that amount.

"Q. As I understand it this Frye account was applied first to the payment

of the indebtedness then owmg the company by Mrs. \¥alker.
''A.

Yes, sir.

"Q.

That was some three odd thou-

sand

dollars~

''A.

Yes, sir.

'' Q.

And that left a balance?

''A.

Left a balance of somewhere

around two thousand dollars.

"Q. It was with reference to that
balance Mr. Walker told you to hold it
and apply it on future purchases of Mrs.
Walker, was iU
''A.

Yes, sir.

It will be seen from the testimony of Mr.

J. R. ·walker, the next witness, that in having
the account of Alice Young Frye transferred to
himself it was the same as though he had delivered to the appellant an equal amount of
cash for the purpose specified.

The history,

therefore, of the Alice Young Frye account becomes unimportant and absolutely immaterial.

6
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By its pleadings appellant has admitted the existence of the account standing in the name of
25

31

respondent. Mr. Walker says that he put the
account there; that he was trustee for her, and

34

37 held the fund in trust for her.

Finally Mr.

Walker's testimony is as follows:

'' Q. Now, I will ask you to state
whether or not this account of Mrs.
Young's or Miss Frye's was transferred
to youf
''A.

I had for years ,and years back,

she was our old nurse girl, and I had the
handling of this fund, had it long before
I put it in the store. I put it in there, I
was trustee, and in my last year I had
Mrs. Chase transfer it to my account. I
didn't want to involve her in any receivership proceedings. I was taking care of
this fund for her. I told Mrs. Chase to
transfer it to my account and apply
enough to clean up Mrs. Walker's account
and I would leave the balance there for
her account. She was in the habit of running an account of two or three thousand
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dollars a year. I could have drawn it out
if I wanted to.
'' Q.

Mrs. Chase told you at that time

she did do
''A.

that~

Yes, she did that.

'' Q. You left it there upon the reliance of that

statement~

''A. Left it there expecting it to be
paid on my wife's future purchases.
'' Q.

That is the way you want to ap-

ply it now?
"A.

Yes, sir."

The appellant offered no evidence. By stipulation all of the evidence introduced in the case
of C. G. Renshaw against this appeHant was conf:-\idered as evidence in this case. The bill of exceptions settled in said action was also incorporated in and became part of the record in this
case on appeal.

In the Renshaw case Mrs.

Chase was the first witness, and testified concerning deposits made by Mr. Renshaw and Miss
Salisbury with \V,alker Brothers Dry Goods

8
Abs.

48

Trans.

Company.

(Renshaw Transcript 34.)

She ex-

plained the nature of the special accounts of
Renshaw and Salisbury; how they were entered
upon the books of the company, and how special
time deposits were maintained in the company's
banks more than sufficient to pay all of the deposits made by employees similar to the deposits
of Renshaw, Salisbury and Alice Frye. She also
testified on cross examination concerning certain
changes that had been made when Mr. Dreyfous
purchased the business and before the receiver
was appointed. It is submitted there is nothing
in the testimony of Mrs. Chase in the Renshaw
case which in any wise detracts from her testimony in the case at bar or from the testimony
of Mr. Walker. The only bearing it could possibly have would be to show the nature of the
account of Alice Frye prior to the transfer thereof to the respondent herein. If the respondent
is correct in his assumption that what happened
prior to the transfer of this account to J. R.
Walker is immaterial, then the entire testimony in the Renshaw case is likewise immaterial.
75

In the Renshaw bill of exceptions the following
appears:

(Renshaw Trans. 61.)
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"MR. MOYLE: The record may show
that we withdraw in open court, and with
the consent of counsel on the opposite
side, the right of setoff heretofore claimed
in our pleadings, without in any wise affecting our claim to the right of preference for the fu1l amount.''
Judgment was entered for the respondent,
therefore, for the full amount of his claim and
the setoff as prayed for was not allowed.
ARGUMENT
\VHEN rrHE PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT
HEREIN, THEREFORE, DEPOSITED WITH
\VALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMpANY SOME FIVE OR SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS, WFrH THE REQUEST THAT IT BE
USED F'IRST TO PAY HIS WIFE'S ACCOUNT TO DA 'rE AND THEREAFTER THE
BALANCE TO BE PAID UPON HIS WIFE'S
FUTURE PURCHASES, \VAS A TRUST CREATED?
$2,909.85 is admitted to be the balance left
with \Valker Brothers Dry Goods Company to pay
for respondent's wife's future purchases. Mr.

10
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Walker states that Mrs. Chase, cashier, bookkeeper and control accountant, told him that she
would do that, and that she did do it, and that he
left the sum of $2,909.85 with Walker Brothers
Dry Goods Company in reliance upon its agreement to use the same to pay his wife's future purchases; that that was the way he wanted to have
it applied. The allegations of the complaint conform to the evidence in alleging that the sum of
$2,909.85 was to be retained and held for the sole
and specific and special purpose, and that only,
of securing the payment and of paying for the
future goods, wares and merchandise to be purchased by the wife of plaintiff; that said deposit
was accepted and held by the store as a special
fund or deposit for the specific use and purpose
for which it was delivered, received, accepted and
held.

It is admitted that upon the appointment of

the receiver there came into his hands sums of
money in excess of the amount of plaintiff's claim.
In leaving· the sum of $2,909.85 with Walker
Brothers Dry Goods Company to pay for future
purchases of respondent's wife, the funds of that
company were clearly augmented to the amount

11
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of said deposit. This deposit took place in May
of 1930, and the receiver was appointed in the following June. It, therefore, necessarily follows
that if a trust was created by said deposit the
general creditors of Walker Brothers Dry Goods
Company are not entitled to participate in the
$2,909.85 deposited by respondent which in turn
augmented the assets of Walker Brothers Dry
Goods Company, and pa.rticularly the cash on
hand. The legal presumption is that the money
which came into the hands of the receiver contains the trust funds held by the insolvent, that
is to say, the insolvent spent its own funds first.
·whether or not the presumption is rebuttable,
the respondent sustained the burden of proof required of him when he showed that the money
actually came into the hands of Walker Brothers
Dry Goods Company, and that there was cash on

hand the day the receiver took charge in an
amount equal to or greater than the balance of
the trust funds in question. Inasmuch as the appellant did not offer any evidence ·to rebut this
presumption, it would make no difference in the
case at bar whether we consider the presumption
as rebuttable or not. The respondent is entitled
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to full payment as a preferred creditor, in accordance with the decisions hereinafter set forth.
A TRUST WAS CREATED
Even the cases cited and relied upon by appellant recognize the principle upon which respondent's claim is predicated. In the case of
Northern Sugar Corporation vs. Thompson, 13
Fed. (2d) 829, where a general deposit of funds
had been made to meet the beet pay roll, the
Court says, at 831:
"Whether a deposit in a bank is general or special depends upon the contract
resulting from the mutual understanding
and intention of the parties at the time
such deposit is made.''
And again:
"Where the depositor, at the time a
deposit is made, enters into an understanding and agreement with the bank
that the money deposited is for a specific
purpose, and for that alone, as funds deposited to pay a particular note, draft or
check, such deposit partakes of the nature

13
Abo.

Trans.

of a special deposit, the relation between
the depositor and the bank is that of principal and agent, and the title to the deposit remains in the depositor.''
This principle applied to the facts in the case at
bar clearly illustrates the right of the respondent and the right of Walker Brothers Dry Goods
Company to give and accept the deposit made
by Mr. Walker for a special purpose, to-wit: the
payment of his wife's purchases. The distinction
between the facts of this case and the case at
bar is clear,ly shown by the following quotation
from the opinion of the court, quoting a portion
of the testimony given upon the trial :
''I expected the 'beet pay ron' checks,
when presented, would be paid promptly,
the same as any check that I might issue
against a bank in which I had an account.
The balance in the 'beet pay roll' account
shifted from day to day.''
It certainly was proper for this court to hold, in

the light of that evidence, that the deposit of the
Sugar Company was general. There is, however,
no analogy between the facts of that case and

14
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the transaction of the respondent with iWalker
Brothers Dry Goods Company.
The next case cited of Noyes vs. First Nat.
Bank, 167 N. Y. S. 288, involves another general
deposit in a bank upon which checks were drawn
to pay interest on interest coupons. The court
clearly holds that these funds were paid out of
the bank on the check of the company, the same
as any other general deposit.
The case of Holland Trust Company v.
Sutherland, 69 N. E. 647, is specifical,ly referred
to in this opinion. In that case the Court of
Appeals of New York says:
"The effect of that transaction was to
make the plaintiff trust company a trustee
for the coupon holders whose claims were
to be paid out of the fund so deposited.
Before the coupons were due, a creditor
of the Delaware Water Company levied
an attachment on said moneys .as the
property of a nonresident defendant. The
legal effect of that special deposit not
only created the plaintiff trust company
a trustee for the coupon holders, but it

15
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changed the title to said moneys from the
water company to the trust company, in
whose possession it constituted a trust
fund for the benefit of coupon holders as
cestuis que trustent. The trust company
,adopts this view of the law, and in its
complaint expressed its desire to pay
these coupon holders the moneys in question, and asks a court of equity for instruction in the premises, based on special
reasons.''

In the case of Fralick v. Coeur D'Alene
Bank & Trust Company, 210 P.ac. 586, the Idaho
court recognizes the right of a bank to make
special deposits. This court clearly holds that
the question turns on whether the deposit is a
general or special deposit, and that if the latter,
it is a preferred claim. The evidence in this
case as detailed in the opinion of the court shows
a case of a general deposit, but the court
says:
"If ,a bank accepts a deposit from A,

under an agreement to pay it to B, the
contr:act is one for the benefit of B. It
has been held that such a contract creates

16
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a trust relationship m favor of B., and
that in ease of insolvency of the bank the
trust relationship win be recognized, and
B. is entitled to recover the trust fund, if
it can be traced into the assets of the
bank. \Voodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104,
64 N. E. 292, 58 L. R. A. 385. \V e think this
rule is correct, if B. did not consent that
the deposit ,should be considered as one
for his credit. The evidence in this case,
as we construe it, fails to show a contract
which gave the holders of the coupons any
right of action against the bank.''
In Tucker v. Linn et al. (N. J.), 57 Atl.
1017, relied on by appellant, it is said:
"The charge is that particular money
was paid over by the complainant to the
defendant's intestate to be invested in securities, and these securities were to be
held by the defendant's intestate.

No

equitable title to the money passes in such
a case. No equitable title to the securities
in any way exists in the holder. If this
bin had been proved to be true, then John
Linn received money which he had no
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right to appropriate to his own use. He
did not, by receiving the money, become a
debtor

to

the

complainant.

He

was

charged with the duty of expending these
moneys for securities or investing them
in securities, and when he did so the
equitable title to those securities would
be in the complainant, and he would be
the mere trustee, not having any beneficial ownership.''
The case of Fidelity Savings & Loan Association v. Rodgers et al. (Cal.), 182 Pac. 426,
can have no bearing on the present controversy.
The Court in this case says:
''The expressions used, however, show
that it was regarded and treated by her
as an 'account' in her favor against the
plaintiff, to be paid out by it on her order, and as both parties have discussed
the case solely upon the theory that it
was a general deposit for exchange or
credit, we will assume that such was its
character."
The case of Bledsoe v. Hammons, 36 Ariz.
489, 287 Pac. 297, relied on by appellant on page
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31 of its brief, involves a bank account of a
fraternal order. The name in which this bank
account stood was changed from the individual
name of the treasurer to the name of the organization for which he held it.

This change

was made just prior to the appointment of a
receiver. It involves nothing more than a change
in the name under which the deposit was held.
The deposit was a general deposit, subject to
checking account both before and after this
change. It is in no wise enlightening, therefore,
so far as the present controversy is concerned.
We turn now to the authorities relied on by
respondent.
Michie on Banks and Banking, Vol.
III, Ch. 6, Sec. 186, p. 259.
"It is a well established rule that

moneys received by a bank to be applied
to a particular purpose or to be remitted
to some creditor of the person paymg
such sums, are regarded as trust funds,
and a claim therefore is ordinarily entitled to preference over the claims of
general creditors in the distribution of the
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assets of the insolvent bank. Thus money
intrusted to a bank for investment is a
trust fund. And, where money is deposited with a bank, to be applied in the payment of a note or other obligation on
which the depositor is liable, the bank
holds it as a trust fund and not as the
assets of the bank and it may be followed
and reclaimed from the assignee or receiver. The reason of the rule is that the
re,lation between the depositor and the
bank as to such deposits is that of principal and agent, or trustee and cestui que
trust and not simply that of depositor
and depositary."

3 R. C. L. 146.
''The law prescribes no particular formula for the contract involved in making
a special deposit. Like all contracts, it
grows out of the mutual intention and understanding of the parties. The purpose
and terms of the deposit may be explicitly stated, or the intention of the parties
may be inferred from their declarations,
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considered in connection with their conduct and all of the circumstances.''
Mothersead v. Harrington, Okla. 250
Pac. 483.
In this action the plaintiff paid into the
defendant bank the sum of $709.65 which was
heJd by said bank to be paid as the balance due
on :a contract for the sale of an oil and gas
lease, upon the seller, a minor, becoming of age.
In the meantime the Bank passed into the hands
of a receiver. This case not only holds that this
sum was held in trust, being a special rather
than a general duposit, entitling plaintiff to a
preferenee, but furthermore holds that the commingling of this money with other moneys of
the Bank did not in any wise prevent the plaintiff from reclaiming it as a preferred claim. The
court quotes with approva'l from the case of Secrest v. Ladd, 112 Kan. 23, 209 Pac.

8~4,

as fol-

lows:
''·where a special deposit is placed in
a bank to be used only in payment of certain shares of capital stock of the bank
when the same should be duly authorized

21
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and issued, which stock was not authorized nor issued, but the bank misappropriated the money so deposited and used
the same in its general business, thereby
augmenting its assets, and where shortly
afterwards the bank became insolvent and
its assets passed into the hands of a receiver, the special deposit constitutes a
trust fund which the beneficiwl owner was
entitled to follow and reclaim from the
augmented assets in the hands of the receiver in preference to the claims of general creditors.''

It likewise quotes from 31 A. L. R. at page 472
the following general rule :

''It may be stated as a general rule
that where a deposit is made in a bank
with the distinct understanding that it is
to be held by the bank for the purpose of
furthering a transaction bPtween the depositor and a third person, or where it is
made under such circumstances as give
rise to a necessary implication that it is
made for such a purpose, the deposit becomes impressed with a trust which en-
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titles the depositor to a preference over
the general creditors of the bank where
it becomes insolvent while holding the
deposit."

This case of Secrest v. Ladd, 112 Kan. 23,
209 Pac. 824, cited with approval in the Mothersead case, deserves more than passing comment.
The facts are so nearly analogous to those in the
case at bar that there is little, if anything, to
distinguish the two cases. The Kansas case deals
with a deposit made by Secrest sixty days before
the insolvency of the bank for the purpose of
paying for thirty-one shares of the bank's o>vn
stock when the same was authorized and issued
to Secrest. The depo-sit was made and accepted
for this special purpose. The increase of stock
had not been authorized nor had any stock been
issued to Secrest when the bank became insolvent. There were some two hundred thousand dollars remaining upon the closing of the bank and
about ninety thousand dollars in claimed preferences. In the case at bar we have a total of
$11,268.33 in 'preferred claims for which the
Court has had that much cash in the hands of
the receiver set aside with which to pay such of
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the preferred claims as are final,ly adjudged
preferences. It is further shown that general
creditors will receive approximately 55o/o of their
claims. The two cases thus far are entirely analogous. $2,806.73 of the $3,875.00 deposit in the
Kansas case was made up by the transfer of
certificates of deposit on other banks. $1,068.47
was a check or receipt transferring to the bank
a savings deposit of $1,068.47 which Secrest had
in that bank. The trial court allowed a preference
so far as the $2,806.73 was concerned, but denied
a preference as to the $1,068.47 which was merely
transferred from the savings account to the bank

to be held for this special purpose. Each party
appealed, the receiver for the bank because of
the preference allowed on the $2,806.73, and Secrest because he had been denied a preference
on the $1 ,068.47. The Supreme ~Court reversed
the ~ower court so far as the $1,068.47 was concerned, and allowed Secrest a preference for the
entire amount. Therefore, so far as the $1,068.47
is concerned, the two cases are still analogous.
The Kansas Court in its opinion sayR:
"Was the special deposit made by the
plaintiff in the bank a trust fund, and, if
it has the trust character, can it be fol-
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lowed and payment required out of the
assets of the bank in preference and before distribution to general creditors?''

This is the identical question presented m the
case at bar. The ,Court goes on to say:
"There can be no doubt of the fiduciary relation br:>tween the plaintiff and the
hank. The fund was placed in the bank
to be applied to a specified purpose for
the benefit of plaintiff.''
Herein lies the only difference between the Kansas case and the case at bar. In the case at bar
the fund was placed in the hands of appellant to
be applied to a specific purpose, to-wit: the benefit of a third party. This difference strengthens
respondent's contention. It might, under some
circumstances, be possible to say that a fund
deposited for the benefit of a depositor himself
did not constitute a trust, but it is difficult to
conceive of the circumstances under which such
a deposit made for the benefit of a third person
could be held otherwise than in trust. This is
the case at bar. The court says further:
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"It was intrusted to the bank to be

applied in payment of the shares of capital stock when the same was authorized
and issued.

The increase of stock was

never authorized, and no shares were issued or delivered to plaintiff before the
failure of the bank. It is agreed that the
fund was to be for no other than the specified purpose. The beneficial ownership
of the fund remained in the plaintiff, and
the misapplication .of it by the bank did
not change its trust character.''
The second question as to whether or not
the funds could be traced is likewise answered
by this court in its opinion:
''Can it be identified or traced to the
assets of the insolvent bank which came
into the possession of the receiver? He
holds it by no better title than did the
trustee, and he took the assets of the insolvent bank subject to any trust impressed upon them. Instead of holding the
fund for the specific purpose and application, the bank converted and mingled it
with its general funds using it to honor

26
Abs.

Trans.

checks, make loans, and as a part of its
cash and sight exchange. The special deposit was made about two months before
the bank was closed for insolvency and
possession of its assets was taken by the
bank commissioner. If the trust fund can
be identified, it may be followed through
every mutation and subjected to the trust.
The fact that it was mingled with the general deposits and used in the general
business of the bank did not take away
its trust character nor prevent the owner
from reclaiming it if it can be traced into
existing assets in the hands of the receiver."
The Court further says :
"The theory was that, as the fund
never belonged to the bank, creditors were
not injured if it was turned over by the
assignee to its owner."
Finally the Court says :
"Here the funds were augmented and
bettered to the extent of the amount of
the fund misappropriated and used in

th~
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business of the bank. The assets which
came into the hands of the receiver greatly exceeded the amount of the trust fund
in question and in fact of all the trust
funds claimed. The right to follow and
retake the proceeds of trust property
ceases only when assets into which the
fund has come have been expended so
that no part of them can be traced to existing assets.
''No reason is seen for disallowin~· a
preference for the amount drawn out of
the savings account by plaintiff and turned
over to the bank as part of the special deposit. It was as effectually

impres~ed

with the trust as if plaintiff had drawn the
cash from the bank and placed it with
other moneys in the fund to be used for
the specified purpose.''
citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company v.
Bank, 109 Kan. 772, 204 Pac. 992.
It is submitted therefore, that the rules laid

down in the opinion in Secrest v. Ladd are very
peruasive, and, respondent believes, controlling
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m the case at bar, because of the adoption of
these same rules by this court in its prior deClSIOns.

In the case of Jones v. Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, Uta:h, 228 Pac. 896, this
court gave in effect, to the purchaser of an automobile a preference of $1500.00 over general
creditors of an automobile sales agency then in
the hands of a receiver. Respondent sees little
difference between the facts in the Jones case
and in the case at bar. Jones delivered to NaylorWoodruff ~Company an automobile to be sold by
them for $1,500.00, the sale price, when collected,
to be applied toward payment for a new automobile. The $1,500.00 was obtained before the
receiver was appointed but no automobile was
delivered. Jones did not seek to obtain a return
of the $1,500.00. He sought possession of the
automobile he desired to purchase or had agreed
to purchase. To give him this automobile the
court had to find him to be a preferred creditor.
Had Jones sued to recover $1,500.00 as a preferred creditor rather than to sue for the automobile the case would have been identical with
the case at bar. He would have recovered the
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$1,500.00. A careful reading of the opmwn of
this court in that case leaves no doubt as to
Jones' right to recover the $1,500.00, had he sued
therefor mther than for the automobile.

No

matter in what light the Jones case is examined,
we must necessarily come to the conclusion that
the deposit of that $1,500.00 to be applied on the
payment of the purchase price when received
from the sale of the old automobile was a special deposit he.Jd by Naylor-\Voodruff Company
in trust for one purpose only, the purchase of a
new automobile. The facts are no different in
the case at bar. Mr. ·walker had transferred into
his own right the account of Alice Frye. He had
V\T alker Brothers Dry Goods Company immedi-

ately apply the major portion thereof to the
payment of an existing indebtedness incurred by
his wife and he entered into an agreement with
·walker Brothers then and there that the balance of said fund should be held by Walker
Brothers Dry Goods Company for the sole purpose of paying for the future purchases of Mrs.
Walker. It is difficult to see how any deposit of
money could be made for a more specific, definite purpose, or on the other hand, how the conclusion can be escaped that a trust was then and
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there created entitling Mr. Walker to his right
of preference as given him by the decree of the
lower court, when

vV alker

Brothers became m-

solvent and unable to carry out the trust.
Again, in the case of Gay v. Young Men's
Cons. Cooperative Mere. Institution, 37 Ut. 280,
this court recognizes the creation of a trust. The
trust consisted of the receipt of the purchase
price of a piece of land, said purchase price to
be held, first, to secure the debt due from respondent's husband to the parties receiving the
purchase price, and, second, the whole balance
of the funds to be held in trust for the wife. The
court, in recognizing the creation of a trust, says:
''In view of the findings, it must be
conclusively assumed that the parcel of
land conveyed to the appellant corporation was by it accepted in trust to be sold
for the 'best price that could be obtained'
therefor, but, in no event, for less than
1$300; that when sold so much of the proceeds as was necessary to discharge the
debts of respondent's husband to said
corporation was to be retained by it, and
the balance was to be accounted for to
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respondent.

The corporation, therefore,

obtained the property for a special purpose. The purpose was two fold: (1) To
secure the debt due from the respondent's
husband to it; and (2) to sell the property
for that purpose, but for the best price
obtainable, and to hold respondent's share
of the funds in trust for her, and to account to her for the same. The obligation
of the corporation, therefore, was in the
nature of a trust, and its relation to respondent and the fund was in the nature
of a trustee, and we shall so treat it. The
corporation in selling the property was
bound to sell it for the 'best price that
coU!ld be obtained' therefor. If the property was sold for a less price, the corporation would still be liable to respondent
for the difference between what the property was actually sold for and what the
corporation could have obtained for it.''
In the case of Van Alen vs. The American
National Bank, 52 N. Y. 1, the New York Court
of Appeals in its opinion says, at p. 4:

"It appears to me clear that Van Alen
& Rice were the agents of the plaintiff to
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sell the bonds, and were bound to keep
the proceeds of the same for him. He
owned the bonds, directed their sale, and
also directed that the proceeds should be
kept for him in a particular manner, and
he was notified by Van Alen & Rice that
they had been sold and the avails placed
and would be kept as directed. These undisputed facts establish the relation of
trustee and cestui que trust between the
plaintiff and Van Alen & Rice as to the
proceeds of these bonds.''
It is no less certain that the undisputed facts in

the case at bar constitute a trust.
Similar situations are found m the case of
State ex rel Sorensen vs. State Bank of Touhy,
Neb. 240 N. W. 925, in which in the course of its
opinion the Court says :
"It is a stipulated fact that claimant

instructed the officers in charge of the
bank to remit the $4,305.78 to the agent
of the Prudential Insurance Company at
F.argo. Claimant used the check for the
so1le purpose of paying his debt by bank
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remittance. What the banker entered on
the books and on the so-called 'deposit
slip.' to the contrary was the work of the
bank and did not record the consent of
claimant to ,a deposit. If the amount of
the check was a mere credit on the checking account of claimant, the bank could
not have used the funds for the remittance directed by him without his personal check, which was never drawn. What
was called a 'deposit slip' amounted to
no more than receipt for the check delivered to the bank for the sole purpose of
providing the means for the remittance
ordered. The bank received the check as
a trustee, converted the proceeds, used
them for banking purposes, and is accountable as trustee. The proceeds constituted trust funds which belonged to
claimant pending the execution of the
trust -

an unperformed duty of the

trustee. The trust funds never became the
property of the bank and are not assets
distributable to depositors.''
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39 A. L. R. 930.
"ln that case" (Northwest Lumber Co.
v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 225 Pac.

825) "it appeared that a corporation,
having certain bonds outstanding, drew a
check on its general deposit in a bank
which was trustee for the bondholders, in
favor of the hank, for the amount to become due on the bonds, and sent it to the
bank. Before it could be passed through
the bookkeeping routine of the bank and
marked 'Paid,' the bank was closed by
the state authorities. It is held that, immediately ·on the acceptance of the check
by the bank, the amount represented
thereby became a specific deposit for the
·purpose of making the designated payments, and that the depositor had a preferential claim for that amount. The court
holds that it is immaterial that the assets
of the bank were not augmented by the
transaction.''
''So, in Lusk Development & Improv.
Co. v. Giinther (1925) Wyoming 232 Pac.

518, the beneficiary was held to be entitled to a preference with regard to
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money paid to a bank to obtain a deed
held by it in escrow.

The court held,

further, that in such case the burden was
on the claimant to identify the money to
which a trust in his favor had attached,
but that, in so doing, he was aided by the
rule that if a trustee mingles trust funds
with his own it is presumed that, in making subsequent payments, he uses his own
money, and not the trust fund. Applying
this rule, it was said: 'In the case at bar
only five days intervened between the
time that the payment herein was made
and the time that the bank closed. The
presumption is, as stated before, that
men act honestrly, and, carrying that presumption to its logical conclusion, and applying it reasonably, as may well be done

in the case at bar, we should, we think,
presume that the trustee in this case did
not pay out the trust money, but retained it, and that it passed into the hands
of the receiver; hence, throwing the burden to produce evidence to show the contrary on the latter'."
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In the case of Littman v. Broderick, 250 N.
Y. S. 546 a deposit was made at the Bank of
United States for payment to a creditor in Havana, Cuba. The Bank issued the usual receipt
for such mom•y. rph(• creditor in Cuba declined to
aceept the money a11d the depositor sued for its
return after thE' Bank of United States closed its
doors. 1'he court held the. deposit a special deposit for a particular purposP and held that the
Bank, having failed to carry out that purpose, was
bound to retnrn the money. In the option in tnis
case the court cites and quotes from the case of
Cutler v. American Exchange National Bank, 113
N.Y. 593:

"In that case the plaintiffs deposited
with the defendant bank at New York tl1e
sum of $500 for payment to one Hall in
Leadville, Colo., and received the bank's
receipt therefor. The bank at Leadville
went into the hands of a receiver before
the transaction was concluded, and sought
to evade liability, disclaiming that the deposit was a special deposit. The court, by
Judge Gray, said: 'The deposit was a special one for a designated beneficiary, and
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could not be used or dedicated by the defpndant to any other purpose. No system of
bookkt>eping entries would be allowed to
cause thP plain agreement of the parties to
miscarry, ()ither with respect to a payment
to Hall, or to its return to the depositors
in the event of the failure of the defendant
to cause such payment.' "
'l'he Court in its opinion also states as follows:
''In Libby v. Hopkins, 104 U. S. 303,
3W, 26 L. Ed. 769, the court said: 'vVhen
A. sends money to B., with directions to
apply it to a debt due from him to B., it
cannot be construed as a deposit, even
though B. may be a banker. 'l'he reason is
plain. The consent of A. that it shall be
considered a deposit, and not a payment, is
necessary and is wanting.' ''
If this is true, as it undoubtedly is, then it neces-

sarily follows that the consent of J. R. Walker to
become a general creditor of Walker Brothers Dry
Goods Company and not to have his wife's future
account paid with the deposit is necessary and is
wanting.
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Reichert, State Banking Com'r v. Midland County Savings Bank, 236 N.

vv.

859

"The question

IS

whether the deposit

is a preferr·ed claim against the receiver.
"The general rule, as stated in 31 A. L.
R. 473, is: 'It may be stated as a general
rule that where a deposit is made in a bank
with the distinct understanding that it is
to be held by the bank for the purpose of
furthering a transaction between the depositor and a third person, or where it is
made under such circumstances as give rise
to a necessary implication that it is made
for such a purpose, the deposit becomes
impressed with a trust which entitles the
depositor to a preference over the general creditors of the bank where it becomes
insolvent while holding the deposits.' "
''The parties to a special deposit in a
bank ordinarily do not contemplate that
the bank shall set aside specific currency
to be held in its vault, but that it will collect outside checks in the usual manner
through correspondents upon whose books
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they have credit. The practice here followed was usual, showed no intention on the
part of the bank to change its agreement
and convert the deposit into a general one;
nor, having received it in specific trust,
could it lawfuUy have so converted it without consent of the depositor.
'' 'J1he writing of the certificates of deposits was for convenience in bookkeeping.
'rhey were not issued as negotiable paper,
as they were not delivered to the depositor.
The fact that the bank informed Gallagher
that the account was so handled did not evidence an intention to modify the contemporaneous specific agreement that the deposit was in trust; nor did it have such
legal effect.''
In the case of Hudspeth v. Union Trust &
Savings Bank, 195 N. W. 378, 31 A. L. R. 466, it
was held that money placed in a bank to be delivered to one who has contracted to ·outfit a cafe
as soon as his c.ontract is complied with, is a trust
fund. In its opinion the Court says:
"Without restating the facts, it is quite
clear that, by the original transaction, a
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trust was ereated. Although the identical
funds

W(~re

not kept separate, the transac-

tion itself was considered as an escro\V
transaction, and so shown on the escrow
register of the Bennett concern, which
passed to its successors. 'l'he letter of instructions of April 26th passed from the
Bennett Company to its successor and on

to the receiver. Both banks had notice and
knowledge of the character of the transaetion. In addition to this, it affirmatively appears that the fund has not been dissipated, but has come into the receiver's hands
as a traceable account, or an augmentation
of the whole estate. vVe do not understand
appellee to contend, or the cases to hola,
that it is necessary to identify the partieular funds. The evidence shows without dispute that at all times both the Bennett
Loan & Trust Company and its sueeessor
had a sufficient amount on hand to pay this
claim, and a sufficient amount went into
the hands of the receiver to pay it. Under
the recent case of Messenger v. Carroll
Trust & Sav. Bank, 193 Iowa, 608, 187 N.
W. 545, this was sufficient tracing of the
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funds into the hands of the receiver, and
the estate was augmented to the extent of
the deposit.''
In the Hudspeth case, quoting from Jones v.
Chesebrough, 105 Iowa, 303, 75 N. W. 97, it is further said:

" 'It appears that the money in question was received by the Cadwells, and that
their estate was increased by that amount.
As they received it, knowing its trust character, it will be presumed, in the absence
of a showing to the contrary, that it was
preserved by them in some form, and that
it passed into the hands ·of the assignee. It
is not material for the purpose of this case
whether the balance was preserved in the
form of money or in other property. It is
only necessary that it appear, by presumption of law or otherwise, that it has been
preserved in the hands of the defendant.
The money having been traced to the estate
of the Cadwells impressed with the character of a trust fund, the burden was upon
the defendant to show that it contributed
nothing to the estate which he acquired by
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virtue of the assignment, and that he has
failed to do.' ''
"The relation of a bank toward a depositor who places money with it for a
special purpose of paying a note held by a
third person is that of a trustee, and tne
amount so deposited is a special deposit
within the rule allowing the recovery of a
special deposit as a preferred claim after
the insolvency of the bank. Central Bank
& T. Co. v. Ritchie (Wash.) supra." (120

Wash. 160, 206 Pac. 926 [1922.])
''In Capitol N atl. Bank v. Coldwater
Nat. Bank (1896) 49 Neb. 786, 59 Am. St.
Rep. 572, 69 N. W. 115, writ of error dismissed in (1899) 172 U. S. 434, 43 L. Ed.
505, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873, it was said that
a fund which comes into the possession of
a bank, with respect to which the bank has
but a single duty to perform, and that is,
to deliver it to the person entitled thereto,
is a trust fund, and is incapable of being
commingled with the general assets of the
bank, subsequently transferred to its receiver."
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"In People v. City Bank (N.Y.) supra"
(96 N. Y. 32) (1884) "it was said with
reference to cheeks deposited in a bank for
the specific purpose of paying certain notes
held by a third person: ''The checks were
impressed with a trust, and no change of
them into any other shape could devest it
so as to give the bank or its receiver any
different or more valid claim to them than
the bank had before the conversion.' ''
''Where the owner of a house damaged
by fire took the check received from the insurance company to a bank, and stated that
she wanted it collected and kept by the
bank for the particular purpose of paying
the contractor who was repairing her
house, but refused to .allow it to be credited
to her checking account, whereupon she
was given a receipt bearing the words 'Sp.
Dept.,' it was held that, on the insolvency
of the bank, her claim should be treated as
a trust fund, entitling her to a preference
over the general creditors of the bank."
"In Lamb v. Ladd (1922) 112 Kan. 26,
209 Pac. 826, it was held that the owner
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might recover as a trust fund a deposit
made in a bank in an escrow account to be'
paid to a third person on the fulfillment by
him of a certain contract for drilling an
oil well, or returned to the depositor on the
failure of the third person to carry out his
part of the contract, where it appeared that
he had so failed, and the hank had commingled the deposit with its general funds
used in the general course of its banking
business, and had subsequently become insolvent.''

"Where a purchaser of real estate delivered to a bank a sum of money to be
paid over to the se1ler when he should present to the bank a warranty deed, property
executed, together with an abstract showing good title, and took a receipt from the
bank, reciting tne purpose for which the
money was left with it, on the subsequent
failure of the bank it was held that the
fund was impressed with a trust, and coufd
be recovered from the receiver in preference to the general creditors of the bank.
And the fact that the bank, without the
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knowledge or consent of the purchaser,
gave credit on its books to him as ·of a general deposit, and mingled the money with
its general funds, was held not to change
the character of the transaction.'' (Kimmel v. Dickson (1894) 5 S. D. 221, 25 L.
R. A. 309, 49 Am. St. Rep. 869, 58 N.

Vv.

561.

''Where the cashier of a bank negotiated a loan for a purchaser of real estate,
and, by agreement between the vendor and
purchaser, he was to collect the draft given for the loan and hold the same until the
transaction was closed, and then turn the
proceeds over to the vendor, it was held
that the fundR were impressed with a trust
in favor of the vendor, and so did not pass
to the receiver of the bank on its insolvency; and this was true despite the fact that
a certificate of deposit was issued to the
vendor for the amount, since such certificate, under the circumstances, amounted
to no more than a receipt or acknowledgment that the bank held the money for the
vendor under the terms stipulated, and did
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not make the vendor a general depositor.
State ex rei. Ladenburger v. State Bank
(1894) 42 Neb. 896, 61 N. \V. 252."
Corporation Commission v. Merchants
Bank & Trust, 138 S. E. 530, 57 A.
L. R. 382 (North Carolina)
Quoting from Morton v. Woolery, 189
N. \V. 232)

" '\Vhere money

IS

deposited for a

special purpose, as, for instance, in this
case, where it was deposited for the stated
purpose of meeting certain checks to be
thereafter drawn against such deposit, the
deposit does not become a general one, but
the bank, upon accepting the deposit, becomes bound by the conditions imposed,
and, if it fails to apply the money at all,
or misapplies it, it can be recovered as a
trust deposit.' "
The North Carolina court then says :
"Brushing aside the cobwebs, m this
action the $20,000 Page check was deposited upon the distinct agreement and under-
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standing that Angelo Bros. were to check
out $12,950 to pay off the lien; in fact, the
$20,000 check was part purchase price of
lana that there was a lien for $12,950 on.

"The $20,000 deposit was impressed
with the trust to the extent of $12,950. The
specific purpose was to pay out of it the
$12,950. Under the facts and circumstances
of this action, equity will hold the $12,950
for the benefit of Angelo Bros. The check
was held in trust by the bank for this specific purpose. The brulance, it would seem, under the facts disclosed, was a general deposit. There is no question as to the bank
collecting the check as it was marked 'paid'
the very day of the deposit. In a eourt of
equity, the general rule is 'Equality is
equity,' but not so, as in this action, the
check of $20,000 was impres-sed with a
trust of $12,950. This amount has priority
of payment out of 'the assets in the hands
of said receiver.' As to the balance of the
$20,000 deposit, Angelo Bros. is a creditor
like any other unsecured creditor."
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In the case of Blythe v. Kujawa (Minn.),
220 N. W. 168, 60 A. L. R. 330, it appears
that the plaintiff purchased a farm from
the defendants Kujawa. It was agreed that
$4,500, a note, and a mortgage on the property should be left in escrow in the National Farmers' Bank until title to the farm
was perfected and approved and a deed
given. This agreement was carried out
through the agency of F. M. Blythe, a
brother of the plaintiff. By direction of an
officer of the bank, F. M. Blythe deposited
the check in the bank to his own account.
The banker then made out a check for the
amount on the National Farmers' Barik,
payable to John Kujawa, the vendor of tfie
farm, and directed F. M. Blythe to sign it,
which he did. The note, the mortgage, and
the check to Kujawa were placed in an envelop by the banker, with directions on the
envelop to deliv;er over the $4,500 to Kujawa when the conditions with regard to
the warranty of title had been complied
with. The bank credited its assets with the
check for $4,500 deposited to the account
of F. M. Blythe. F. M. Blythe never drew
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out any of the $4,500 so deposited. The
bank failed and its assets passed into the
hands of a receiver before the title to the
land was perfected. On the tender of the
waranty deed, the receiver refus,ed to receive the deed or recognize the escrow. The
court holds that the $4,500 was a trust fund
and special deposit held by the bank, and
that the plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the $4,500 trust fund.

And in Evans v. People's Bank, 6 S.

vV.

(2d) 655, where $4,000 was deposited in the
defendant bank, with directions that the
bank use this money to purchase certain
government bonds, the court held that sue'h
funds constituted a special trust fund, and
entitled the plaintiff, on the bank's insolvency, to a preferred claim in the assets
of the bank, saying: ''Plain tiff had a checking account in the bank. She delivered to
the cashier two checks on this account for
$2,000 each, payable to bonds, and directed
him to invest the proceeds of said checks
in government bonds for her. The cashier
charged these two checks to her account,
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thus withdrawing $4,000 from said account.
"\:Vhile it is true that the $4,000 may not
have actually passed into the physical possession of the cashier, yet the legal effect
of charging thes,e checks against plaintiff's
account, under the circumstances here
shown, was to place $4,000 of plaintiff's
money in the hands of the cashier, with
special instructions from plaintiff to invest it in government bonds for her. The
cashier violated his instructions by investing the money in time certificates of de•
posit in said bank, instead of investing it
in government bonds, as he was directed to
do. rrhe voluntary, wrongful, and unauthorized act of the cashier in placing this money on time deposit and issuing certificates
of deposit therefor, without the knowledge
or consent of plaintiff, could not have the
effect of forcing her to accept a relation
with said bank that she never intended to
create, or change the relation that was

ac~

tually created at the time plaintiff delivered the checks to the cashier and directed
him to invest their proceeds in government
bonds. Relationships are created by the
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conduct or agreement of both parties, and
not by the voluntary act of one party without the knowledge or consent of the other.
Ellington v. Cantley (1927) Mo. App. 300
S. W. 529, 530; William R. Compton Co.
v. :F'armers r.l,rust Co. (1925) 220 Mo. App.
1081,279 S. \V. 746, 749. \Ve therefore hold
that the unauthorized act of the cashier in
investing plaintiff's money in time certificates of deposit did not create the relation
·of debtor and creditor between plaintiff
and the bank. A trust has been defined to
be 'a holding of property, subject to a duty
of employing it or applying its proceeds
according to directions given by the person
from whom it was derived.' 39 Cyc. 17. The
supreme court of this state, in Corby v.
Corby (1884) 85 Mo. 371, defines a trust
as follows: 'A trust is a relation between
two persons, by virtue of which one of
them (the trustee) holds property for the
benefit of the other (the cestui que trust).'
The transaction had between plaintiff and
the bank created a relation of trust, and not
of debtor and creditor. When the bank accepted the money from plaintiff with speci-
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fie directions to invest it in govemment
bonds, thE: titl<> thereto did not pass, but
the bank

tlwn~after

held the money in trust

for plaintiff, subject to the duty of investing it in government bonds as directed by
plaintiff.''

Also in Greenfield v. Clarence Sav.
Bank Mo., 5 S. \V. (2d) 708, it appeared
that the plaintiff, George W. Greenfield,
who had no account with the Clarence Savings Bank, went there for the sole purpose
of purchasing bonds as an investment, and,
on the suggestion of its president, he left
$2,000 with the bank, with the distinct understanding that the bank was to purchase
bonds of the Farm & Home Savings &
Loan Association of Nevada, .Missouri, for
him with this money. \Vhen George \Y.
Greenfield made the deposit in the Clarence Savings Bank, he was given a receipt
as follows: "Clarence, Missouri, March 10,
1925. Received of George \Y. Greenfield,
Leonard,

Missouri,

two

thousand

and

nojlOO doHars for the purchase of four
five hundred dollar coupon bonds of the
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Farm & Savings and Loan Association, Nevada, :Missouri, $2,000. Clarenee Savings
Hank, by M. H. Lewis, President,'' The
Clarence Savings Bank later became insolvent. The court, in holding that the plaintiff
was entitled to a preference, that the deposit made was a special deposit, said:
''The trial court, in our view, properly held
that it was the intention of plaintiff and the
understanding of the bank that the money
was accepted by tlie bank as a special deposit for the specific purpose of purchasing bonds. The fact that, after the insolvency of the bank, M. H. Lewis, its president, gave his personal note for $2,000 to
plaintiff Greenfie1ld, as collateral security
for the payment of the deposit, with
the understanding that the note was to
be returned to Lewis after Greenfield
should receive his money from the finanee commissioner upon liquidation of
the bank, cannot in any manner affect
the plaintiff's right to follow and recover the special deposit, where, as here,
the right of no creditor of the bank has
been prejudiced by the taking of the security."
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In Re Security Sav. Bank (Iowa), 217 N.
vV. 831, it appeared that George J. Dugan
was the attorney for the administrator
with the will annexed of the estate of one
·white, and was also a representative of the
\V estern Surety Company. A loan to be
made on the property of the vVhite estate
was in contemplation, and, in the negotiations therefor, it became necessary for the
administrator of the White estate to furnish a bond. The bond was furnished by the
·western Surety Company and was ·executed by Dugan as the representative of
that company. In order to secure the payment of the premium on the bond, heirs of
the ·white estate deposited the amount of
the premium, $314.53, with the Security
Savings Bank, for which a certificate of
deposit or cashier's check was issued, and
held by Dugan. Later, before the bank
closed its doors, Dugan, through ·a representative,

demanded

payment

of

the

$314.53. The representative was induced
by the officers of the bank to leave the
amount in the bank on special deposit and
to accept the following certificate: "Securi-
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ty Savings Bank, Perry, Iowa, Jan. 24,
1925. No 5214. Geo. Dugan, trustee, has
deposited in this bank three hundr,ed fourteen and 5:3j100 dollars, $314.53, payable
to the order of himself as trustee in current funds on the return of this certificate
properly indorsed. Special deposit as per
notation on back. H. N. Graves, Cashier."
On the back of the instrument appeared
the following: "This amount of $:314.53' is
a special deposit, and paid into this bank
for the ,express purpose of paying the
premium of a bond of Western Surety
Company to Annis & Rohling in J olm
\Vhite estate, and said funds are a special
deposit for said purpose, and preferred
claim for the above amount. Security Savings Bank) by N.H. Graves, Cashier." Later the bank became insolvent, and its assets passed into the hand of a receiver. The
court held that the appellant, Dugan, was
entitled to a preference, since the fund constituted a special deposit, and the bank
held the money as trustee, and since the
funds of the bank were thereby augmented
and so had passed into the hands of the
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receiver. In so holding, the court said: "It
is also well settled that a special deposit, or
a deposit for a specific purpose, creates a
trust relation as between the depositor and
the bank, which will entitle him to a preference. Officer v. Officer (1903) 120 Iowa,
389, 98 Am. St. Rep. 365, 94 N. W. 947;
Hudspeth v. Union Trust & Sav. Bank
( 1923) 196 Iowa, 706, 195 N. \V. 378, 31
A. L. R. 466, and cases cited in note in the
latter publication. See also 7 C. J. 631, 751.
Here the character ·of the deposit as special was recognized, the purpose for which
the money was to be used was designated,
and the right of the depositor to a preference was secured by the express terms ·of
the certificate issued by the bank, the written contract between the parties. The basic
fact upon which a preference must be predicated, the existence of a relation of trust
between the bank and the claimant, could
not be more definitely and certainly established.''
The foregoing authorities and the rules enunciated therein establish beyond a doubt the
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creation and existence of a trust in the case at
bar.

In answer to the further contentions of appellant we cite the following cases. They not only
further tend to establish the existence of a trust
but likewise lay down the rule that a definitB presumption exists in case of a trust followed oy
insolvency, that the insolvent has used its own
funds first, and that what remains and passes to
the receiver contains either the trust funds or the
proceeds therefrom. In case of money the rule
simply requires sufficient moneys to come into
the hands of the receiver to meet the requirements
of the trust. Respondent endeavors to establish the
further rule that the burden of proof resting upon the plaintiff is sustained upon proving the existence of the trust, and that the trust fund augmented the assets of the insolvent coming into the
hands of the receiver; that upon the establishment of such a prima facie ease the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant; that this presumption can only be overcome by evidence to the contrary; and furthermore, that this presumption is
very greatly strengthened when there is but a
short time intervening between the deposit of the
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trust funds, that is to say, the creation of a trust,
and the appointment of a receiver. In the case at
bar but thirty days intervened. When the receiver
was appointed at the end of the thirty day period
more than enough cash passed in to the hands of
the receiver to meet the preferred claim of the
respondent, and additional assets sufficient to pay
general creditors approximately fifty five per cent.
Rather than to discuss these questions further in
our own language, we have quoted rather liberally from the cases which we cite and rely upon. We
feel justified in so doing because of the importance
to the respondent of establishing his preference.
\V e have endeavored to confine ourselves to the
citation and discussion of leading cases only. This
Court has heretofore seriously considered these
questions in the case of Tooele County Board of
Education v. Hadlock. Respondent contends that
the opinion in this case should control in the case
at bar. Except for the contrary position taken
by appellant in its brief many of the cases cited
would have been unnecessary. We pass, then, to
a review of these cases.
In the case of Tooele County Board of Education vs. Hadlock, 11 Pac. (2d) 320, this court
says:
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''An essential requirement of the law
as to which there is no dispute between
counsel for the parties is that, in order
for funds in a bank or otherwise to be
impressed with a trust, they must have increased or augmented the assets of the
trustee coming into the hands of the receiver."
The County Treasurer in this case issued a check
on the funds in the bank for $120,000.00 in favor
of the Board of Education. It was argued that
this did not augment the funds of the bank; that
it was a mere bookkeeping transaction. The
Court says:
''No case has been called to our attention, and none has been found by us holding that under circumstances such as these
a deposit made in a bank by means of a
check drawn on that bank wi11 not be impressed with a trust where it would have
been

·SO

impressed had the check been

drawn on another bank. It is undisputed
that there was in the bank more money
than was required to pay the check when
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it was presented to the bank on December

24, 1930.''
Again, in the case at bar, the same contention
is made that by the transfer of the account of
Alice Young Frye to J. R. Walker the assets of
Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company were not
augmented. The analogy between the situation
here and in the Tooele case is identical. It is
undisputed that Walker Brothers Dry Goods
Company had sufficient funds with which to pay
off the entire account assigned to J. R. \V"alker.
Mrs. Chase says,

18

''A.

At this time Mr. ·walker asked me to
transfer the account of Alice Young Frye
from her savings account to pay the account of Mrs. J. R. Walker and it left a
balance of two thousand dollars, somewhere around that. He said Mrs. vValker
would be charging more merchandise and
we would use that to pay the account, use
this two thousand to pay the account when
her account was that amount.''

and Mr. Walker testified:
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"

I could have drawn it out if I wanted
to.''

The situation, therefore, is identical with the
Tooele situation. This court in its opinion further says, page 323:
''The transaction was one equivalent to
the board demanding and receiving its
money and thereafter placing it on deposit in the bank to its credit. Had this
been done, there would have been no difference in the status of the deposit from
that of the $66,448.86 which the court
found to have been impressed with a
trust. The authorities sustain the view
that this is an augmentation of the funds
and is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the law in that respect."
Likewise, Mr. vValker could have withdrawn the
money, for his testimony stands uncontradicted,
and he could then have redelivered it to \Valker
Brothers Dry Goods Company for the special
purpose of paying his wife's account. No other
conclusion can be reached, therefore, than that
the cash on hand of Walker Brothers Dry Goods
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Company was augmented by the $2,909.85. The
quotations contained in the Court's opinion from
the cases of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank, 109 Kan. 772, 204 Pac. 992, and
Northwest Lumber Co. v. Scandinavian American Bank of Seattle, 130

~Wash.

33, 225 Pac. 825,

are peculiarly in point.

We have heretofore suggested in this brief
that appellant is entitled to the benefit of the
presumption that what remains at the time of
insolvency is a trust fund. The Court says at
page 325:

"The same rule as to identifying or
tracing the funds applies to public as to
private funds. The money must be identified or traced into some other specific
fund or property. There is a presumption,
however, that what remains at the time of
insolvency is a trust fund. The law presumes that trust funds were not appropriated and that a balance of cash in the
hands of the depositary is the trust
funds.''
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While in the Tooele case this presumption was
in part at least rebutted by evidence offered for
that purpose, in the case at bar the presumption
stands. No pleadings attack it. No evidence was
offered to rebut it. The defendant admitted par·agraphs eight and eleven ·Of plaintiff's complaint,
thereby in effect admitting that the receiver received sums of money in excess of the amount of
plaintiff's preferred claim upon his appointment
as receiver, and that the assets which came into
his hands were sufficient to pay approximately
fifty-five per cent. of the amount of the claims
of general creditors. As a result thereof, respondent is entitled to the full force and effect
of the presumption, and if, therefore, the respondent is correct in his contention that this
fund is a trust fund, he is entitled to be paid in
full as a preferred creditor. This Court goes
on to say in the Tooele case:

"The :law has been fairly stated in the
Wyoming case of Lask Development &
Improvement Co. v. Giinther, 32 Wyo.
232 P. 518, 520."
This Court then quotes from the Wyoming case:
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" 'Starting out, then, with this established principle, that money in the
case at bar must be traced and identified
in some specific fund or property in the
hands of the receiver-not, however, the
identical money paid in-the question remains, whether, indulging in all proper
presumptions, that has been done in this
case. The burden of proof to do so is on
the cestui que trust. 39 Cyc. 532. But,
when certain facts are shown, a presumption may aid him and the burden to produce further evidence may shift to the
opponent. First Nat. Bank v. Ford, 30
i

Wyo. 110, 216 P. 691. The presumption
is that men act honestly; that when a
trustee mingles trust money with his
own, and then draws out sums from a
common fund by check or otherwise, it
will be presumed that he drew out his
own in preference to the trust money'."
citing cases including Waddell v. Waddell, 36
Utah 435, 104 Pac. 743, and continues:
''This principle has frequently been
applied to cases where an insolvent, at
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the time of the insolvency, had a certain
balance of money on hand which went
into the hands of the receiver, and in
such case it has frequently been presumed
that such balance included the trust
money.''
It is said in the case of Sherwood v. Central
Michigan Savings Bank, 103 Mich. 109, 61 N. W.
352:
''The courts are not overtechnical or
zealous in seeking an opportlmity to say
that the trust fund or property cannot be
traced or that it has disappeared altogether from the fund in which it or its
proceeds have been comingled where there
is evidence from which the contrary may
legitimately be inferred.''
In the case of Yellowstone Company vs.
First Trust & Savings Bank, 46 Mont. 439, 128
Pac. 596, it is held that where trust funds are
mingled with funds of the Bank the entire mixed
fund is subject to the trust except to the extent
that the Bank is able to distinguish and separate
its own from the trust fund, and in such cases
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the burden is on the Bank or its receiver to show
that the commingled fund or that \Vhich remams
therein is not subject to the trust.
In the case of Thompson vs. the Bank of
Syracuse, 278 S.
6 S.

vV. 810 and in Evans v. French,

vV. (2d) 655, although the Missouri Court

held that it was encumbent upon the beneficial
owner of a trust fund to trace or fo>llow the
same into the hands of the receiver, nevertheless
it held that the showing that the trust fund was
commingled by the Bank with its general assets
and that assets came into the hands of the receiver sufficient to cover the trust fund is sufficient without a more particular tracing of the
trust fund to subject the entire assets m the
hands of the receiver to the satisfaction of the
trust.
Townsend v. Athelstan Bank
Dye v. Hook, 237 N. ,V. 356.
"Manifestly, the intervener deposited
the proceeds of his sale of catNe for the
special purpose of meeting the

Hess

check; or, stating it another way, the intervener made the deposit for the special
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purpose of drawing a check m favor of
Hess against it.''
'' 'When cash remains m the fai,ling
concern at the time it discontinued banking ·operations and such money :was afterwards delivered to the receiver,

* * *

the presumption is that said commingled
fund contains 'the trust proceeds,' and
the latter can be removed from the :whole
:without injury or injustice to the general
creditors because there :was 'augmentation.' Charity assumes that the trustee
did no wrong, but spent and disposed of
his own property and retained that which
belonged to others'."
From a note in 82 A. L. R. at 141 we take
the following:
''As we have seen, the commingling of
a trust fund with the funds of the trustee
bank does not extinguish the trust nor defeat the right of the beneficial owner to
follow his fund into the hands of the
bank's receiver, since the identity of the
specific money representing the trust fund
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IS

immaterial. See subd. XI. a, b, supra.

It is settled by the overwhelming weight

of modern authority that where the bank
commingles trust funds with funds of thPbank, all withdrawals and disbursements
by the bank for its own purposes out of
the mixed fund are presumed to be of the
bank's own portion of such fund, ratl:er
than of the trust funds, so long as the balance of the common fund remains in excess .of or equal to the amount of the trust
funds, since it is presumed that the trustee acted rightfully and left the trust
funds intact, rather than that he violated
the trust, and any balance remaining in
the common fund and passing into the
hands of the receiver is presumed to include or to be a part of the trust funds
and is subject to the trust.''
At page 1-67 of the same note the author has the
following to say:
"The Court in Carlson v. Kies (1913)
75 Wash. 171, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317,
134 Pac. 808, having stated the doctrine
as a rule of substantive law, expressed
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its doubt as to the desirability of treating
it as a mere presumption.

"It will be noted that the case of
Knatchbull v. Hallett (1879) 13 Ch. Div.
(Eng.) 696----'C. A., does not lay down the
rule that this presumption is rebuttable
by evidence of facts or circumstances
showing that the trust money has in fact
been withdrawn from the common fund,
where the balance of the fund exceeds the
amount of the trust money. On the contrary
as will be noted, the language of J essel, M.
R. is that where one can rightfully perform an act, 'he cannot say'-'he is not
allowed to say'-that the act was in fact
done wrongfully, and that, applying this
principle to the case of a trustee who has
blended trust moneys with his own, 'he
cannot be heard to say' that the trust
money was used and his own funds left
intact. And the principle is thus stated
in the dissenting opinion of Thesiger, L.

J., who, wMle indicating his approval of
the doctrine of a majority of the courts,
as a matter of principle, felt constrained
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by the authority of earlier cases to give
effect to the rule of Clayton's case (1816)
1 Meriv. 572, 35 Eng. Reprint, 781, 3 Eng.
Rul. Cas. 329: 'The presumption of a man's
innocence of crime may reasonably be set
off against the presumption that he intended such an appropriation of payments upon
his banking account as could only exist if
he intended to commit a crime; and to the
argument adduced by Mr. Hallet's representatives in the present case, that the
facts proved indicate that he did in fact intend to misappropriate, and had misappropriated, the trust property, the am;wer
might be given, as it might have been give11
to Mr. Hallett himself if he had been alive
to use the argument, 'allegan:;; suam turpitudinem non est audiendus.'

This lan-

guage would seem to indicate that the
principle supporting the modern

doctrim~

is not merely a logical presumption that
the trustee will act rightfully rather than
wrongfully, which may be rebutted by direct evidence to the contrary, but is a rule
of substantive law, analogous to the doctrine of eS'toppel, by which the trustee
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and those claiming under him are absolutely precluded from saying that the
trustee used the trust money rather than
his own, or from taking advantage of the
trustee's own wrongful a0ts.''
From page 204 of the same note we copy the
following:
"Where it is shown that the trust fund
has been mingled by the bank with its own
funds, it has been held that the burden
shifts to the bank's receiver or assignee
to distinguish between the bank's own
property and that of the cestui que trust.
Smith v. Mottley (1906; C. C. A. 6th) 80
C. C. A. 154, 150 Fed. 266, 17 Am. Bankr.
Rep. 863. The whole fund may be held
subject to the trust until an equitable separation of the trust money may be made.
First Nat. Bank v. Williams (1926; D. C.)
15 F. (2d) 585. The fund resulting from
the commingling is impressed vvith a trust
to the amount of the trust money mingled
therein.''
In the case of Eastman vs. Farmers' State
Bank of Olivia (Minn.), 221·N.

vV.

236, it is said:

72
''The burden of proof goes no farther
than to require plaintiffs to show that the
money actually came into the hands of the
bank. That such was the fact is conceded.
Had there been on hand the day that
Veigel as superintendent took charge of
the bank an amount in cash equal to or
greater than the balance of the trust
funds in question, 1plaintiffs would have
been entitled to full payment as a preferred creditor. This proposition is supported by numerous authorities and is
conceded. ''
In Woodhouse v. Crandall, 64 N. E. 292, a
question arose as to whether $1,500.00 deposited
with the Bank to secure the performance of a
certain lease constituted a trust fund. The court
says:
''This deposit was for a specific purpose, for the benefit and security of a
third person (Charles F. ·woodhouse),
and it created a trust relation in his
favor. The banking firm assumed the position of a trustee, and the money deposited constituted a trust fund, which the
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bank was bound to keep intact for the
purpose of the trust. The obligation of
the bank was to preserve the sum of $1,500 as a trust fund for the person mentioned in the receipt, and to apply it to
the purposes therein specified, and the
title to such trust fund did not pass to
the bank as a part of the general funds
of the firm. ''
The court not only found a trust to exist but
further stated at page 294:
''The presumption in such a case is
that the money drawn out by the depositor is his own, even if the trust money
and his own are in one account, rather
than that he had disregarded his trust
,and violated his duty. The supreme court
of the United States, ,approving of that
decision, held in Central Nat. Bank of
Baltimore v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693, that ,although
the relation between a bank and its depositor is that merely of debtor and creditor, and the balance of account i,s only a
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debt, if the money is held by the depositor
in a fiduciary capacity its character is not

changed by being placed to his credit
with his own money in his bank account.
Money having been placed in the vaults
of the bank, the law presumes that the
trustees drew out their own money first,
and that what remained belonged to the
trust. "\V"hen the firm failed, there was remaining in the vault where this money
was put $1,152.66 in cash, which the receiver obtained, and the legal presumption
is that this belonged to the trust fund.''
In the case of Carlson v. Kies (Wash.), 134
Pac. 808, a special deposit of some $3,000.00 was
made a few days before the Bank closed its
doors, to be held until certain receipts were received. The court in this case says:
''On the other hand, when a bank accepts a special deposit it becomes a trustee of the depositor and holds the money
subject to the trust. The receipt itself affords strong, if not conclusive, evidence of'
a special deposit. It shows that the money
was placed in the bank for a special pur-
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pose. Fortified by the evidence of the depositor and the admitted circumstances
here present, it is obvious that both parties to the transaction intended to make
a special and not a general deposit. It
follows, therefore, that the bank holds the
money, not as a general debtor, but in a
fiduciary capacity.''
And again:
"The doctrine of the modern authorities and what we consider the sounder
view is that the trust fund is recoverable
where an equal amount in cash remained
continuously in the bank until its suspension and passed to the receiver.''
And again:
"In Fogg v. Tyler it was held that,
where a sum of money in excess of the
amount of a specia1l deposit was m the
hands of the trustee bank when it became
insolvent, the trust will be enforced notwithstanding the fact that the identical
money cannot be identified. It was said
that it suffices if it can be traced into the
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hands of the trustee 'either in its original
or its altered state.'

The Shopert case

voices a like rule. There the court also
said that receivers take the property of
the insolvent subject to all legal and
equitable claims, and that, when a fund
consists of money, 'identification does not
require that the identical bills or coins be
discovered, but the ascertainment of the
fund into which it has entered and lodged
is sufficient'."
This presumption that the trust funds are
included in the moneys on hand at the time the
receiver takes charge is strengthened when the
time intervening between the deposit and the
failure is relatively short. In this case Walker
made the deposit in May; the receiver was appointed in June. In the annotation in 82 A. L. R.
at page 93 we find the following:
''The fact that only a short time
elapsed between the receipt of the trust
fund by the bank and the final closing of
the bank because of insolvency logically
reduces the probability that the fund has
been paid out or dissipated by the bank.
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Indeed, this interval may be so short as
to reduce almost to zero the probabi>lity
that the fund was lost before the closing
of the bank. And the courts sometimes
give much weight, if not controlling effect, to the shortness of this intervening
period.''
This statement IS amply borne out by the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the ease of Lusk
Improvement Company vs. Giinther, 32 Wyo.
294, 232 Pae. 518, cited with approval by this
Court in the Tooele hank ease. See also Carlson
v. Kies (Wash.), 134 Pac. 808 and Secrest v.
Ladd (Kan.), 209 Pae. 824, in which latter ease
60 days elapsed. The same rule was nevertheless
applied.
Fully one-half of appellant's brief is devoted
to a discussion of the account of Alice Frye prior
to its assignment to the respondent. According

to the evidence as detailed in appelant 's brief, Mr.
Walker held and accumulated a fund in trust for
Alice Frye and this fact was known to Mrs. Chase,
the control accountant. The funds, therefore, came
into the hands of Walker Brothers Dry Goods
Company with knowledge on its part of the trust
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relationship existing between the respondent and
Alice Frye. On page 12 of appellant's brief appellant quotes from the testimony of Mr. "\Valker
in which Mr. "\Valker says, "I put it in there,"
(speaking of Mrs. Frye's deposit) "I was trustee.'' There can be no question, therefore, that
whatever moneys \Valker Brothers Dry Goods
Company took of Alice Frye the same was impressed with the trust existing between the respondent and Alice Frye. \V" alker Bros. Dry Goods
Co., or the appellant standing in its shoes, could
not claim to stand in the position of a bona fide
purchaser without notice.

~Whether

Alice Frye was

a simple contract creditor, as claimed by appellant, or not ceases to be of controlling importance
upon the transfer of the deposit to the respondent
and the definite

chang(~

made by the respondent in

the nature of said deposit at the time of said
transfer. On page 7 of appellant's brief appellant
states that in May, 1930, and while respondent was
president and director of the Company, he made
settlement with Alice "B-,rye and she assigned her
claim against the company arising out of the deposit of funds, to the respondent. The credit balance in favor of Alice Frye at this time approximated the sum of $5,909.85. In emphasizing the
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fact that respondent was president and director
of the company at this time, that is, May, 1930,
and ordered the control accountant to do as he
said, appellant overlooks the fact that on page
two of its own brief it has emphasized the fact
that -walker at that particular time was only a
figurehPad. He was not ordering any one at that
time. Quoting from appellant's brief:

1928''
(speaking of respondent) "he was the ac"From

1903

to

November,

tive head of the business, but after that
date Dreyfous completely ordered its destinies and the plaintiff Walker was only
a figurehead.''

\V alker entered into a new agreement with the
Company at that time. The Company acte<!
through Mrs. Chase, its control accountant, who
was in turn under Mr. Dreyfous, the general manager and actual head of the Company. After the
transfer of the Frye account to respondent th8re
waS' no agreement on the part of the Company to
pay interest upon the $2,909.85 or to hold the same
as an account payable to an employee or as
an employee's savings account. Whatever may
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have been the nature of the deposit in favor of Mrs. Frye, after the transfer to Mr.
Walker a new and entirely different relationship came into existence.

There was a def-

inite novation. In place of an account upon which
the company paid interest, the company, in legal
effect, paid the total amount of the deposit of Mrs.
Frye to the respondent and the respondent in turn
applied $3,000.00 thereof to the payment of his
wife's present indebtedness and deposited with
the Company under an entirely new, separate and
distinct arrangement the balance of $2,909.85, to
be held by the Company for the specific and sore
purpose of paying for his wife's future purchases.
It is with this transaction that we are concerned

upon this appeal. \i\Te can rely with implicit confidence upon the deeision of this Court in the case
of Tooele County Board of Education v. Hadlock,
11 Pac. (2d) in which the Court says:
''The transaction was one equivalent to
the board demanding and receiving its
money and thereafter placing it on deposit
in the bank to its credit."
On this particular point appellant relies largely on the case of Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U. S.
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254, 76 L. Ed. 1089. An important detail distinguishes this case from the case at bar. We have
involved in the Blakey case a trust ex maleficio.
In the annotation in 82 A. L. R. at page 159 tlie
cases are cited dealing with trusts ex maleficio. In
the case of People v. California .Safe Deposit &
T. Co. 175 Cal. 75,6, 167 Pac. 388, the question is
asked," Can the wrongful act of the party obtaining the money furnish the basis for making him a
trustee, and at the same time the ground for presuming that he acts

rightfully~"

And the Court

disposed of this question in the negative. Numerous other cases are cited in which it is held that
the presumption in favor of the trust funds upon
commingling thereof does not exist in cases of
trusts ex maleficio. Furthermore, in the Blakey
case there is no third person such as we have in
the case at bar. Had the savings account in the
Blakey case been closed and had the bank agreeu
to hold the amount thereof for the sole purpose
of paying a definite obligation of a third person
thereafter to become due, we would have a situation similar to the case at bar. As the case stands,
we do not. We wish at this point to emphasize the
fact that the Court in this opinion says:
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"It would have been equally compet-

ent for respondent to have provided for the
purchase of the bonds by the creation of a
trust of funds in the hands of the bank to
be used for that purpose."

Inasmuch as the Court found from the evidence
that he had not done this the case is clearly and
definitely distinguish from the ease at bar. The
evidence in the ease at bar of both Mr. Walker
and of Mrs. Chase stands uncontradicted that such
a trust was created. Counsel in his brief attempts
to distinguish the Tooele County case from the
case at bar.

In making this comparison ap-

pellant assumes there was no change in the status
of this account npon the transfer thereof to Mr.
"'\\Talker and thereafter the agreement upon the
part of Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company to
hold the balance to pay it for the indebtedness of
l\lrs. \Valker. Inasmuch as this assumption is contrary to the law, as herein cited, the purpose of
the attempted comparison must fail. Appellant has
likewise overlooked the fact that Walker Brothers
Dry Goods Company took Mrs. :B..,rye 's money from
the respondent knowing it was held by respondent
in trust for Mrs. Frye and, therefore, impressed
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with the same trust in their hands. We believe, by
the authorities which we have heretofore cited,
that we have amply substantiated our position that
the assets of Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company were augmented in May of 1930 by J. R.
Walker leaving with the Company the sum of $2,909.85 for the payment of his wife's future account. \:V e contend likewise that we have established by the authorities cited the existence of a
presumption in favor of respondent. The moneys
which came into the hands of the receiver, being
greater in amount than respondent's claim, included the trust fund to which respondent is entitled.
Had this not been the case, after our establishing
our prima facie case, the burden of proof shifted
to the appellant to prove the contrary. The facts
and the figures and all of the information were
peculiarly within the knowledge of the appe1lant.
The appellant nevertheless offered no proof whatsoever to rebut said presumption and, therefore,
upon this appeal should not be heard to say that
respondent has failed to trace the proceeds of the
trust into the hands of the receiver.

The third proposition dwelt on atgreat length
by appellant in its brief, commencing at page 34,
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has likewise been fully answered by the authorities herein cited. Appellant would go hack and insist upon respondent tracing the funds of respondent's assignor. This, of course, becomes unnecessary under respondent's theory of the case. There
were funds ou hand with whieh to pay the full
amount of .Mrs .

.B~rye's

account in May of 1930,

when the same was transferred to J. R. ·walker.
He in effect gave to the company $2,909.85 at that
time, within a month of the appointment of a receiver. The receiver received more than the
amount of respondent's preferred claim in cash
and enough other assets to pay general creditors
approximately fifty -five per cent. We have clearly
established facts sufficient to establish a prima
facie case, upon which the presumption is predicated. \Vhat happened prior to May of 1930 is immaterial.

On page 31 and on page 34 of appellant's
brief appear statements in bold, heavy type. Eacn
of these statements might be material and important, as respondent has indicated heretofore, had
this action been brought by Mrs. Frye in her own
right prior to any assignment or change in the
condition of the account. The first statement on
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page 31 complains because each of the original
deposits of Mrs. Frye have not been traced specifically into the hands of the receiver, and the second statement, on page 34, complains of the fact
that these original deposits of Mrs.

]~rye

were

intermingled with the funds of the corporation
used in the business of the corporation and have
not been traced into the hands of the receiver. The
entire balance of appellant's brief is largely devoted to a discussion of cases which might have
some application or bearing in a suit instituted
by Mrs. Frye, but no bearing in the instant case,
subsequent to the assignment of the account to
\Valker and the new agreement made by Walker
with the corporation. In this latter half ·Of plaintiff's brief the evidence concerning bank accounts
and time deposits, the custom of Walker Brothers
Dry Goods Company prior to Mr. Dreyfous' regime, are discussed at great ~ength, as though they
had some bearing upon the case at bar. Their
importance was terminated upon the assignment
to respondent after Mr. Dreyfous had entirely
changed the old, established methods and customs
of the firm and had accepted said assignment. The Frye account was paid in full and
ceased to exist for all purposes. In lieu thereof a
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new obligation sprang up, in which the company,
under Mr. Dreyfous' management, accepted and
agreed to hold in trust for the use and benefit of
a third person, to-wit: Mrs. ·walker, the sum of
$2,909.85. It is in the light of the conditions as they
existed at the time the receiver was appointed that
a correct decision of this case can be found, not
in the condition of affairs prior to the creation
and existence of the rights of repondent soug·ht
to be enforced in this action. It would be as

us~

less, therefore, to discuss the cases cited in the
latter portion of appellant's brief as it would be
to prolong a discussion of the evidence therein set
forth at considerable length.
In conclusion, it is submitted that a trust relationship was entered into by the respondent and
Walker Brothers in May of 1930, as a result of
which the respondent is entitled to receive as a
preferred creditor the sum awarded him by the
lower court, and is entitled to an affirmance of
the judgment of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,

HENRY D. MOYLE,
Attorney for Respondent.

